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CORPORATE LIQUIDITY, RESERVES, AND THE
ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX.
CHARLES BASKERVILL ROBSON, JR.t
INTRODUCTION

In determining the applicability of the accumulated earnings tax to
a corporation that has permitted its earnings and profits to accumulate
beyond the reasonable needs of the business, section 537 of the Internal Revenue Code specifies that reasonable needs shall include "the
reasonably anticipated needs of the business."' Though the tax has been
in existence since the Revenue Act of 1921,2 this section was first placed
in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Its purpose was to eliminate the
requirement imposed by some examining revenue agents that there "be
an immediate need for the funds in order to justify the retention of
earnings." 3 It was contemplated that "this amendment will cover the
tAssistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 537. Actually, the statutory scheme of§ 531 imposes a tax on
accumulated taxable income (27 % of the first $100,000 and 38 % of the excess) "of every
corporation described in section 532." Id. § 531. "Accumulated taxable income" is defined in id.
§ 535, and a corporation made subject to the tax by § 532 is any corporation that is not a personal
holding company (as defined in § 542), a foreign personal holding company (as defined in § 552),
or a corporation that is exempt from taxation under Subchapter F (§ 501-26) (an exempt organization) and that is "formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect
to its shareholders or the shareholders of any other corporation, by permitting earnings and profits
to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed." Id. § 532(a). Reasonable needs of the
business are relevant because § 535(c)(1) allows a credit, or deduction, in computing "accumulated
taxable income" of "an amount equal to such part of the earnings and profits for the taxable year
as are retained for the reasonable needs of the business," id. § 535(c)(1), and because "the fact
that the earnings and profits of a corporation are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable
needs of the business shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid the income tax with respect to
shareholders, unless the corporation by the preponderance of the evidence shall prove to the
contrary." Id. § 533. In view of this obstacle, and in view of the holding of the Supreme Court in
United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297 (1969), that avoidance of the income tax with respect
to shareholders need not be the sole purpose for the unreasonable accumulation nor the dominant,
controlling or compelling motive but need only be one of the purposes of the accumulation for the
tax to apply, defense of a corporation against assessment of the accumulated earnings tax often
becomes a practical matter of proving the reasonable needs of its business.
2Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 220, 42 Stat. 247. The Revenue Act of 1918 placed the tax
on the shareholders "as though members of a personal service company." United Business Corp.
of America v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 754, 756 (2d Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 635 (1933)
(defending the 1921 Act provision against accusations of unconstitutional vagueness and retroactiv-

ity).
,H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1954) (emphasis added). The committee noted:
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case where the taxpayer has specific and definite plans for ... use in
the business. It would not apply where the future plans are vague and4
indefinite, or where execution of the plans is postponed indefinitely."
The tax regulations under section 537, proposed January 15, 1958,
and adopted May 12, 1959, echo the Congressional committee reports:
In order for a corporation to justify an accumulation of earnings and
profits for reasonably anticipated future needs, there must be an
indication that the future needs of the business require such
accumulation, and the corporation must have specific, definite, and
feasible plans for the use of such accumulation. Such an accumulation
need not be used immediately, nor must the plans for its use be consummated within a short period after the close of the taxable year,
provided that such accumulation will be used within a reasonable time
depending on all the facts and circumstances relating to the future
needs of the business. Where the future needs of the business are
uncertainor vague, where the plansfor the future use of an accumulation are not specific, definite, and feasible, or where the execution of
such a plan is postponed indefinitely, an accumulation cannot bejustifled on the grounds of reasonably anticipated needs of the business.'
This article will examine certain administratively and judicially
developed standards of reasonably anticipated business needs as they
relate to the financial decisionmaking process of management in a
closely held corporation, 6 and more specifically, whether these stan"In some cases section 102 [now section 531] was applied even though the corporation had definite
plans for expansion and the bona fides of the expansion program were not in question." Id.
'Id. The Senate committee's statement is identical. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 69
(1954).
5
Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1(b)(1) (1959) (emphasis added).
'Inthe House version, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 contained a provision which would

have excepted from the accumulated earnings tax any corporation that submitted proof that its
outstanding stock was owned by more than 1,500 persons and that not more than 10 percent of
either the total combined voting power or the total value of all classes of its outstanding stock was
directly or indirectly owned by any one individual at the close of the taxable year. H.R. REP. No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 54, A172 (1954). This provision was eliminated in the Senate committee
because "testimony . . .indicated that it would be very difficult for many corporations which are
generally recognized to be publicly held to establish from its records that not more than 10 percent
of its stock is held by an individual and members of his family" and, more cogently perhaps,
because of "[tihe fact that this tax is not now in practice applied to publicly held corporations."
S. REP.No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 68-69 (1954). This practice continues. See generally 7 J.
MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 39.54 (1967). In Golconda Mining Corp., 58

T.C. 139 (1972) the Tax Court concluded
as a matter of law that the accumulated earnings tax can apply to publicly held corporations. [But this] should only occur where the fact of public ownership is neutralized by
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dards reflect the realities of corporate financial 7needs and planning as
they might exist if uninfluenced by tax motives.

It is implicit in the contention that a tax system is a revenue-raising
system that the business and economic decisions of taxpayers should be
untainted by tax avoidance motives. Though, in the well-known words

of Learned Hand, "there is nothing sinister in so arranging one's affairs
as to keep taxes as low as possible,"' taxpayers ideally ought not to have

to resort to such arrangements when the exigencies of the marketplace
would indicate a different course. However imperfect an economic

system may be, the minimization of the effects of taxes on economic
planning seems to be a worthwhile goal.'

It is explicit in the statutory scheme of the accumulated earnings
tax that tax avoidance motives should have no relevance to earnings and
profits that are retained for the reasonable needs of business. The gen-

eral rule of section 532(a) and the section 535(c)(1) credit leave no doubt
about that. Yet in a context that requires judicial and administrative

determination of what are "reasonable" or "unreasonable" business
needs, to what extent is it realistic to expect that considerations of such

motives will be ignored? The primary contention of this article is that
the manner in which the company has been managed. If the management group is
dominated by a single large shareholder or a small group of large shareholders who
exercise effective control over the dividend policy of the company or the company
represents itself to prospective or existing shareholders as an investment company with
the avowed policy of accumulating its investment income, public ownership of the company becomes a less important factor in determining whether earnings and profits have
been accumulated for the proscribed purpose.
Id. at 158 (footnotes omitted).
'There is a gap, of course. See Treas. Reg. § 1.533-1(a)(2) (1959). It is theoretically possible
that a corporation could accumulate earnings and profits for anticipated needs not meeting the
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 537 standards and nevertheless prove "by the preponderance of the
evidence" that no tax avoidance motive existed, e.g., that however unspecific indefinite or unreasonable its plans were, they were real plans genuinely based on corporate rather than stockholder
interests. Though this possibility tends to obviate the test of reasonableness, reducing it to one of
genuineness and credibility, in view of United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297 (1969), it is an
unlikely strategy of proof. But see T.C. Heyward & Co. v. United States, 18 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d
5775 (W.D.N.C. 1966).
'Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir.) (in dissent on another point), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 859 (1947).
'The desire for economic neutrality in the tax structure is very much present in the arguments
favoring a "comprehensive tax base" criticized in Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" As a Goal
of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967). Reference is made to the sources cited
therein. Professor Bittker's criticism has to do principally with the impossibility of practical
achievement, but perhaps that has little to do with its desirability.
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the regulatory scheme in respect to "reasonably anticipated needs of the
business" demonstrates an improper reference to suspected tax avoidance motives that is a basic and perhaps irremediable defect in the
accumulated earnings tax structure.
Courts and the Business Judgment of Corporations
The Tax Court consistently has professed its faith in the business
judgment of corporations and its unwillingness to substitute its judgment for that of corporate directors in the determination of the reasonableness of corporate accumulations."0 As summarized by the Eighth
Circuit in Bride v. Commissioner," the Tax Court has expressed
its full recognition that Section 102(a), now 532(a), does not empower
the court to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the corporate
officers in the matter of whether or not corporate dividends should be
declared.
. ..The Tax Court has settled in numerous decisions approved
on review, that determination of reasonable needs of its business is in
the first place a task for the officers and directors of a corporation;
that the court would be hesitant to attribute a sinister or ulterior
motive to them [and] that the law contemplates that any business may
grow and may finance its proper expansion and plow its earnings back
into the business for immediate use and Section 102 is not based on
the contemplation that a business should remain static.'
Further evidence of courts' professed liberal attitude toward business planning is the rule that a corporation does not have to specify on
its books surplus reserves intended to cover reasonably anticipated
needs of the business. 3 On the other hand, and consistent with the
"Dill Mfg. Co., 39 B.T.A. 1023, 1031, not acquiesced in, 1939-2 Cum. BULL. 47. The Dill
case cited Klug & Smith Co., 18 B.T.A. 966, acquiesced in,IX-2 CUM. BULL. 33 (1930) (on the
reasonableness of executive salaries). This case was decided under § 104 of the Revenue Act of
1932, which provided that "the fact . . . that the gains or profits are permitted to accumulate
beyond the reasonable needs of the business, shall be prima facie evidence of a purpose to escape
the surtax." Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 104(b), 47 Stat. 169. The Revenue Act of 1938
initiated the provision that this fact "shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid surtax upon
shareholders unless the corporation by the clear preponderance of the evidence shall prove to the
contrary." Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 102(c), 52 Stat. 447 (emphasis added). This language
remains substantially unchanged to the present day.
"224 F.2d 39 (8th Cir. 1955).
"Id. at 42.
"Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 197, 207 (4th Cir. 1957): "The
Statute imposes no such evidentiary requirement, nor is the mere book entry conclusive . . . that
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"specific, definite, and feasible" requirements of the section 537 regulations, 4 courts are generally in agreement that "some objective evidence
is still necessary to demonstrate that the taxpayer actually intends to
carry out its spending program within a reasonable period of time. '"'
Particularly in the one-man, closely held corporation in which the person "who obviously determined the policy and made the decisions for
the company is the sole stockholder of the company,"' 6 the Tax Court
has not felt compelled to give much weight to a decision to accumulate
reserves for anticipated needs of the business "unless it is supported by
more tangible evidence .

'..."I'

It is now appropriate to examine business planning as it confronts
a "reasonable" business manager. Presumably, it is the reasonable business manager who, tax avoidance motives being absent, will not accumulate earnings and profits beyond the reasonably anticipated needs of
the business. Like his cousin, "the reasonable man of ordinary prudence,"' 8 he is "guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs."' 9
Reasonableness in Practice
For this reasonable business manager the following types of problems might appear. These problems will be examined later in light of
judicial and administrative
views of what a "reasonably anticipated"
20
business need is.
Corporation A manufactures widgets by the age-old, tried-andtrue, standardized method of widget making. The company foresees
that it could sell more widgets since its market is limited only by its
manufacturing capacity. In order to increase the capacity, Corporation A expects to build a new plant in 1973. Blueprints have been
the reserve is for a reasonably anticipated business need."
"See text accompanying note 5 supra.
"Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. United States, 437 F.2d 1275, 1277 (10th Cir. 1971). See

also Henry Van Hummell, Inc. v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 956 (1967).
"Walter C. McMinn, Jr., 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1003, 1021 (1962).
"Id. at 1022.
"Note that the tax regulations speak of "the amount that a prudent businessman would
consider appropriate for the present business purposes and for the reasonably anticipated future
needs of the business." Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1(a) (1959) (emphasis added).
"Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 11 Ex. 781, 784, 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049 (1856).
20

See text accompanying notes 52-117 infra.
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drawn, bids have been taken, the contract has been let, and construction
will begin January 1. Is it reasonable for Corporation A to hold its
accumulating 1972 earnings against the anticipated payment of the costs
of construction and new machinery, rather than paying them out as
dividends to its stockholders?"t
Corporation B is engaged in the manufacture of munitions, which
involves a high risk of explosion or fire. Is it reasonable (and if so, to
what extent is it reasonable) that Corporation B set up a reserve against
anticipated losses from fire or explosion?22
As a variation on the problem of Corporation B, Corporation C is
faced with a substantial risk that is conventionally uninsurable-the risk
of losing a major customer or client, for example.2 Does the business
reasonably need to accumulate funds to cover fixed operating costs if
this contingency becomes a reality? If so, what fixed operating costs
should be covered?
Corporation D operates a bus line in the District of Columbia. Its
diesel-powered buses are substantial sources of air pollution. Not only
is the enterprise faced with a variety of civil nuisance actions seeking
both damages and injunctive relief, it also anticipates that the franchising authority will require prompt replacement of its bus fleet with
pollution-free vehicles when those vehicles become available.24 Gasolinepowered buses that produce lower levels of harmful emissions are currently available, and the company has accumulated sufficient funds to
pay for them. However, management is aware that steam-powered
buses which produce no harmful emissions are being developed, and
21

Each of the corporations in these hypothetical examples uses the calendar year as its taxable
year. The Internal Revenue Service has occasionally argued that funds used to pay dividends from
a closely held corporation will still be available for the reasonable needs of the business in the form
of subsequent contributions to capital. The courts have had little trouble rejecting this. See, e.g.,

Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 197, 205-06 (4th Cir. 1957); Faber Cement
Block Co., 50 T.C. 37 (1968), acquiescedin, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 2.
1Obviously, the cost and availability of insurance coverage through Lloyd's of London or
elsewhere will bear upon the decision here. Conventional coverage on plant and equipment may
be available at "reasonable" cost, but what about protection against business-interruption losses?

Fortunately, this discussion is concerned not with the correctness of decisions, but with their

"reasonableness," and the cost of availablo coverage may not correlate precisely with the reasonableness of a reserve. See Harry A. Koch Co. v. Vinal, 228 F. Supp. 782, 785 (D. Neb. 1964).
13See, e.g., Ted Bates & Co., 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1476 (1965).
2
See, e.g., In re Greater Washington Alliance to Stop Pollution, Inc., I ENVIR. L. REP. 10055
(Aug. 21, 1969) (petition before Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n). This complaint alleged, however, that bus exhaust emissions could be adequately controlled by present
technology.
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tests of their operating efficiency are presently being conducted. No one
now knows if these buses will be commercially viable. Should Corporation D be allowed to postpone replacement of its bus fleet until the
testing of the pollution-free vehicles is completed?
Corporation E is a manufacturer of widgets and like Corporation
A uses the age-old, tried-and-true widget-making method. All of its
widget-making machines now in use were purchased new in the period
1950-1953, and they have been depreciated over an estimated useful life
of twenty years using the straight line method. The company has set
aside funds (equal to its accumulated depreciation plus an amount estimated to reflect the effect of inflation on replacement costs) to replace
these machines as they wear out. However, as some of the machines
become fully depreciated (there is no salvage value) in 1970, 1971, and
1972, the company maintains them in service rather than replacing them
immediately. Though the machines are becoming gradually less efficient, the company anticipates that a new widget-making machine may
become available in 1973, 1974, or shortly thereafter. No one knows
with certainty that the new machine will really work, but if it does, it
will revolutionize the industry to such an extent that those who haven't
the funds to buy it will be forced out of the business. Is management
reasonable in postponing its reinvestment? What if, at the same time,
Corporation E (like Corporation A) is buying more of the old-type
machines in order to increase its capacity?
The experienced business manager will undoubtedly be familiar
with some variation of these five situations, and the experienced tax
adviser will recognize at least the first three. In the language of the
business manager and perhaps the tax adviser, 5 all of these problems
involve the maintenance of liquidity. In what situations is it reasonable
to continue to maintain liquidity in the face of the alternative uses of
funds-immediate investment or perhaps the payment of dividends to
stockholders?
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL THEORY

Incentives to Liquidity
In The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Lord
21See Ziegler, The "New" Accumulated Earnings Tax: A Survey of Recent Developments,
22 TAX L. REv. 77, 83-87 (1966).
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Keynes identifies four "psychological and business incentives to liquidity." 2 the first of these is "the Income-motive," or "holding cash to
bridge the interval between the receipt of income and its disbursement." Lord Keynes advises that "the strength of this motive in incuding a decision to hold a given aggregate of cash will chiefly depend on
the amount of the income and the28normal length of the interval between
its receipt and its disbursement.
The second is holding cash "to bridge the interval between the time
of incurring business costs and that of the receipt of the sales proceeds. '2 Lord Keynes calls this the "Business-motive," but students of
business finance, and tax practitioners who have read the Bardahl
cases,30 will recognize this cash as necessary working capital.3
The third incentive is "the Precautionary-motive," which is intended "to provide for contingencies requiring sudden expenditure and
for unforeseen opportunities of advantageouspurchases ....."I' This

sounds very much like a motive that may be involved in each of the five
hypothetical situations described previously, except that Company A's
liquidity preference, involving as it does a need to expend fixed amounts
at predictable points in time, may seem to some to fit better in the
working capital category of business motives. 3 Lord Keynes observes:
28
See J.M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 194-209
(MacMillan & Co. ed. 1965).
"Id. at 195.
28d.

221d.
"Bardahl Int'l Corp., 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1051 (1966); Bardahl Mfg. Corp., 34 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 1123 (1965).
3
That "the strength of this demand will chiefly depend on the value of current output (and

hence on current income) and on the number ot hands through which it passes," J.M.

KEYNES,

supra note 26, at 195-96, is not quite the way the Tax Court has described necessary working
capital, but one should remember that Lord Keynes was speaking in macro-economic terms, and

the Tax Court seldom, if ever, ought to do so. Lord Keynes' previously quoted observation in
respect to the income motive may seem more familiar to Bardahl readers.
32
.M. KEYNES, supra note 26 at 196 (emphasis added).
aWhile the accounting profession defines "working capital" as "the excess of current assets
over current liabilities," Comm.ON ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE, AM. INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS,
ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULL. No. 43 at 21 (1953), the tax regulations speak in terms of "necessary working capital" (Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2(b)(4) (1959)) which, as defined by the Tax Court, is

"an amount sufficient to cover its reasonably anticipated costs of operation for a single operating

cycle." Bardahl Mfg. Corp., 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1123, 1130 (1965). It is more precise to refer
to the former as net liquid assets and reserve the term "working capital" to describe operating
cash needs as distinguished from other reasonably anticipated and extraordinary needs of the
business, including expansion needs.
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The strength of all three types of motives will partly depend on

the cheapness and the reliability of methods of obtaining cash, when
it is required, by some form of temporary borrowing. .. For there is

no necessity to hold idle cash to bridge over intervals if it can be obtained without difficulty at the moment when it is actually required.

Their strength will also depend on what we may term the relative cost
of holding cash. If cash can only be held by foregoing the purchase of

a profitable asset, this increases the cost and thus weakens the motive
towards holding a given amount of cash.4
The fourth incentive, the "Speculative-motive," is perhaps of less
concern in the context of "reasonableness." If the corporate business
manager is thought to have some fiduciary responsibility to the
shareholder-investors, the reasonable manager ought not hold corporate
funds for "speculative" purposes. Though, as Lord Keynes admits, "the
amount of cash which an individual decides to hold to satisfy the
transactions-motive [the first two motives together] and the precautionary motive is not entirely independent of what he is holding to satisfy
the speculative-motive,"35 the various business needs identified in the
five described situations are speculative only to the degree that the term
describes any uncertainty. The classification of these business needs as
"precautionary," rather than "speculative," at once identifies them as
"reasonable."" 6
But how do these economic forces operate in the financial decisionmaking process of a corporate business? While one familiar with the
risks of the accumulated earnings tax may find the discussions of dividend policy in standard texts on financial management a little naive or
unenlightening, 7 they do provide appropriate indications of financial
J.M. KEYNES, supra note 26, at 196.
111d. at 199. "Speculative" was not used by Keynes in a pejorative sense.
3Other economists have, quite naturally, used different terms. For example, Professor Tobin
identifies funds held for the first two motives as "transactions" and funds held for precautionary
and speculative motives as "investment balances." See Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior
Toward Risk, 25 REV. OF ECON. STUDIES 65, 65-86 (1958). This article was limited to the study
of preferences for different types of monetary assets. For some of Professor Tobin's thoughts on
the holding of liquid (monetary) assets versus investment in capital goods see Tobin, A Dynamic
Aggregative Model, 63 J. POL. ECON. 103, 103-15 (1955).
37For example, H. BIERMAN & S. SMIDT, THE CAPITAL BUDGETING DECISION (2d ed. 1966)
[hereinafter cited as BIERMAN & SMIDT] makes no mention of the accumulated earnings tax, while
P. HUNT, C. WILLIAM SON & G. DONALDSON, BASIC BUSINESS FINANCE (3d ed. 1966) recognizes
the existence of "a considerable body of specialized knowledge about how [the accumulated earnings tax] must be regarded" but does not explore the subject "because of the narrow range of
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management's training and thinking in respect to earnings retention.
Though funds generated by the retention of earnings are occasionally thought to be free of cost, as, opposed to the interest or dividend
cost of newly-raised outside capital, it is almost universally recognized
that such funds do have a cost which "must be measured by the opportunities forgone in using them in one way instead of other possible
ways.1 3s Since the choice is between retaining funds in the corporation
or distributing them to the shareholders "this cost should be measured
by comparing the benefits they would derive from having the funds
distributed."39
It is generally recognized that "the large majority of businesses
consistently reinvest a substantial fraction of current earnings."4 However, at least one text argues that there is no advantage to the shareholders from retention because the shareholder will have to pay taxes on any
ultimate distribution anyway and because it cannot be assumed "that
the addition of a dollar to retained earnings will be reflected by an
increase of a dollar in the market price of equity."'" To ignore the tax
effect on the shareholder of distribution or retention is of course to
ignore all of the theoretically attractive corporate-shareholder tax planning devices which have made the accumulated earnings tax appear
necessary, but it does seem valid that management should
view the investment in a particular business as one of several investment opportunities open to the stockholder. If the stockholder had free
access funds could be withdrawn and used wherever they could be more
profitably invested. [Therefore] every investment, including reinvested
earnings, viewed in this way has its opportunity cost, that is the benefit
[to the shareholders] forgone by not investing elsewhere1 2

companies to which in fact it might be applied." Id. at 284; see note 6 supra. J.WESTON,MANAGERIAL FINANCE (1962) states that the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 shifted the burden of proof so
that "earnings retention is justified unless the Bureau of Internal Revenue can prove otherwise"

and that this "salutary change" "reduces somewhat the uncertainty with regard to the propriety
of earnings retention." Id. at 372.
8
' BIERMAN & SMIDT 153.
'Id. These authors comment that it is not only investment in long-lived assets that may
benefit the shareholders but that benefits may also be derived from, among other things, simply
adding "to the financial liquidity of the corporation by increasing the amount of cash on hand."
Id. at 154.
11P. HUNT, C. WILLIAMSON & G. DONALDSON, supra note 37, at 290.
4

Id.

"2Id. at 452-3.
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Opportunity Cost
The benefit to shareholders forgone by not investing elsewhere may
be expressed in terms of anticipated investment return. Ignoring the tax
costs of distributions, a rough rule might be that the corporation should
accumulate earnings when it can anticipate a return from investment in
the business greater than shareholders could receive elsewhere.
Assume, for example, that a corporation has one million dollars in
invested capital which earns 120,000 dollars a year-a twelve percent
return. Management has under consideration four projects, each costing
25,000 dollars: project A which will earn fifteen percent; project B which
will earn thirteen percent; project C which will earn ten percent; and
project D which will earn nine percent. The corporation can raise new
capital sufficient for any or all projects, either through the issuance of
bonds or new common stock, at a cost of eight percent.
If one ignores peripheral considerations, it is apparent that management should reasonably undertake all of these projects; all are beneficial to the present shareholders since the anticipated return (nine percent plus) exceeds the opportunity cost, or the cost of raising the necessary new capital (eight percent).43 It is equally apparent, however, that
total earnings on invested capital (the old plus the new) will be reduced
from the present twelve percent if projects C and D are undertaken. If
the new capital is to be additional equity, it is unlikely that management
will find these latter projects attractive, particularly if the corporation's
stock is publicly traded and market price is responsive to reported earnings per share.
Suppose the source of "new" capital is last year's earnings, which
could be devoted to these projects rather than distributed to the shareholders as dividends. If tax considerations are ignored, the opportunity
cost will remain the same if it is assumed that the eight percent market
cost of new capital will equal the return that the shareholders might
obtain if they invested the funds outside the corporation. All four projects retain their attractiveness and perhaps are even enhanced by the
ready accessibility of this capital source.44 In this context the payment
of a 25,000 dollar dividend could be described as project E, which offers
13The example, thus far, parallels that in id. at 459.
"Among the non-tax factors that this example ignores is the effect of dividend payments, as
distinct from earnings, on the market price of the stock. If the opportunity cost is calculated
correctly this is reduced to a psychological element which is probably incapable of measurement.
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a "return" of eight percent to the shareholders. While it is less attractive
than any of the projects considered heretofore, it is a more reasonable
use of funds than a project F that would return only seven percent.
It is beyond the intention of this article to describe with precision
the measurement of opportunity costs.45 It is sufficient to observe that,
however described, the consideration of opportunity costs is a reasonable and routine aspect of business financial management. Such measurements have a distinct relevance to considerations of the reasonably
anticipated needs of a business.
The analysis is at its most sophisticated when opportunity cost is
put in terms of the present value of money."6 If present value is thought
of as being simply the value of a distribution of earnings to the shareholders versus investment in the business, it is easily equated with opportunity cost. However, if it includes the value of increased flexibility in
planning which may result from having liquid funds readily available for
unforeseen opportunities, the equation becomes more complicated.
Assume, for example, that a corporation has 100,000 dollars in
liquid funds available from last year's earnings. Faced with spending the
funds on a fixed asset that will earn nine percent per year or distributing
the funds to shareholders to whom the present value is six percent (the
return on investments outside the business), the preceding analysis
would obviously dictate retention of the earnings and investment in the
fixed asset. But suppose the corporation knows that if it holds the
100,000 dollars in a liquid and idle state for five years (with no return)
it would then be able to invest the funds in a fixed asset that would
return thirteen percent per year.
By analyzing these alternatives over a twenty year period they may
be compared in terms of present value. At the end of the twentieth year
the nine percent immediate investment will have earned 180,000 dollars,
whereas the investment postponed five years but returning thirteen percent will have earned 195,000 dollars. Since the 180,000 dollars will be
returned faster, its present value (using the six percent factor) will be
103,229.10 dollars, versus 94,247.50 dollars from the postponed 195,000
dollar return.17 This would seem to dictate immediate investment, but
"For detailed descriptions see BIERMAN & SMIDT and the works cited therein.
"6See BIERMAN & SMIDT 60-73. For a discussion of the classification, or rating, of investment
opportunities by means of calculation of the present value of anticipated yields see id. at 74-105.
"See BIERMAN & SMIDT 386-403 for tables on which these computations of present value are
based.
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if the 100,000 dollars can be maintained in an interest bearing liquid
form over the first five years, e.g., a savings account yielding three
percent, an additional 15,000 dollars will be earned with a present value
of 12,637.20 dollars. The investment of the 100,000 dollars in this form
for five years at three percent and then for fifteen years at thirteen
percent has a present value of 106,884.70 dollars as compared to the
103,229.10 dollar present value of the immediate nine percent return
fixed asset investment. Thus, without considering the uncertainties involved in either choice, the holding of the funds in a liquid state and
postponing the investment becomes more reasonable and attractive than
the immediate investment. In addition, while the computation loses
some authority when the return on either alternative is estimated rather
than certain, it is quite possible in this manner to compute in terms of
present value the cost of postponing the fixed asset investment for one
or more years and then determine that the nine percent return is feasible
and the thirteen percent return is not.18 While this type of analysis is
familiar to the experienced corporate financial planner, it is notably
absent from the approach of taxing authorities to the retention of liquid
reserves.
As noted previously, neither the possibility (or probability) that a
better use of the liquid funds will appear nor the possibility that the
thirteen percent investment opportunity will become available earlier
than the predicted five years is capable of precise valuation. Nevertheless, these possibilities have real value in corporate financial planning
and will increase the reasonableness of holding retained earnings in a
liquid form."
REASONABLE ANTICIPATION AND THE TAXING AUTHORITIES

With these considerations in mind one can examine specific situations in which judicial and administrative views of reasonable anticipation may have differed sharply from the analysis deemed appropriate
in corporate financial management. The five hypothetical problems
posed earlier in this article provide a framework.

"lt is, quite simply, the difference in present value of a 9% return and a 3% return for the

period. For the first year it is $5,660.40.
4

See BIERMAN & SMIDT 61. On uncertainty see id. at 196-217.
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Specific, Definite and Feasible ... and Immediate?

Corporation A's need to pay for its new widget plant is clearly a
reasonably anticipated need. The tax regulations state that one proper
ground for the reasonable accumulation of earnings and profits is "to
provide for bona fide expansion of business or replacement of plant"5
(if supported by sufficient facts and if the general requirements of sections 1.537-1 and 1.537-3 are satisfied). Clearly these requirements are
met. Since the blueprints have been drawn, bids have been taken, and
the contract let, the plans are undoubtedly "specific, definite, and feasible," and the facts at the close of the taxable year could hardly demonstrate a clearer need. 51 Moreover, the reported cases demonstrate that
even less specificity may be allowed. The plans here are comparable to
those for plant expansion in Faber Cement Block Co.1 2 There the "plans
for expansion were not set forth in the minutes or other documentary
material with precision or in detail," 53 but the Tax Court was apparently impressed because the plans were "accomplished within a reasonable time after the years in question at a cost closely in line with the
amount originally estimated." 54 The court stated that the requirement
that there be "'specific, definite and feasible' plans does not demand
that the taxpayer produce meticulously drawn, formal blueprints for
0
action." 55 However, in Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner,"
the Fourth Circuit noted that "formal entries upon the books do not
alone substantiate such needs, nor is justification for such reserves to
be found merely in subsequently declared intentions. The intention
claimed must be manifested by some contemporaneous course of conduct directed toward the claimed purpose."57 Likewise, the "testimony
of the corporation president that an architect had made several rough
sketches of the proposed building" was insufficient for the Tenth Circuit
when the company was unsure of the type of building to be con'Trreas. Reg. § 1.537-2(b)(1) (1959).
"See Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1(b)(2) (1959).
5250 T.C. 317 (1968), acquiesced in, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 2.

=Id. at 332.
"Id. at 333.
"Id. at 332, citing John P. Scripps Newspapers, 44 T.C. 453, 469 (1965) and Sterling Distrib.,
Inc. v. United States, 313 F.2d 803, 807 (5th Cir. 1963).
5241 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1957).
'Id. at 202 (emphasis added).
"Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. United States, 437 F.2d 1275, 1278 (10th Cir. 1971)
(refusing to sustain trial court's finding because it was clearly erroneous).
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structed. 5 In F. E. Watkins Motor Co.,5 the corporation had specific
cost estimates for its planned expenditures which were deemed by the
Tax Court to be sufficient.
Corporation A's reasonably anticipated needs would have been
reasonable needs of its business even before the addition of section 537
to the Code, although the section may have been necessary for a favorable result in Faber Cement, since its plans did not come to fruition in
the immediately following taxable year. Paying for a plant to be built
in the immediately following taxable year would undoubtedly pass the
"immediacy test" as it was being applied prior to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.60 What has often bothered courts in this area, however,
is needs which admittedly are reasonably anticipated but which are not
justified by specific and definite spending plans. Particularly in respect
to the expansion of a business into unrelated areas, which is specifically
authorized by the tax regulations,"' courts have thought that "the need
for tangible evidence of corporate action directed toward fulfillment of
the proposed project is probably most acute. . . since plans of this type
can be easily fabricated and postponed for indefinite periods."6 Such
suspicion may often be justified, but it may also distort the effect of the
accumulated earnings tax, as will be seen when the expansion plans of
Corporations D and E are examined.
Self-Insurance: Specific and Definite?
Corporation B is a self-insurer against losses from fire and explosion and presumably other casualty losses as well. General, or "all-risk"
casualty insurance is so easily available that it might often seem unnecessary and even unreasonable for a corporation to take this risk upon
itself when it can use the risk-spreading device of purchased insurance
to minimize its exposure. 3 Yet courts have recognized that the contin-31 T.C. 288 (1958), acquiesced in, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 5.
coSee text accompanying note 3 supra.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.537-3(a) (1959).
"2 Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. United States, 437 F.2d 1275, 1278 (10th Cir. 1971). In

addition, see Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79, 80-81 (5th Cir. 1961) (affirming Tax
Court finding that plan was vague and indefinite, both asto type of plant to be built and time of
implementation; land bought in 1950 but no further steps through 1959); American Metal Prods.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 860 (8th Cir. 1961).
"Note that the tax regulations provide that business expenses deductible from gross income
as ordinary and necessary include "insurance premiums against fire, storm, theft, accident or other
similar losses in the case of a business." Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (1958).
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gency of such a loss is a reasonably anticipated need of the business. 4
Apparently, the amount of such losses to be anticipated is the full
amount necessary to meet the need, even though historically the current
earnings of the corporation may have been sufficient to cover any
losses."5
The availability and cost of appropriate insurance coverage should
have a direct bearing on the reasonableness of becoming a self-insurer.

If the fire or casualty risk is low, conventional coverage will be available
at reasonable cost. Following the opportunity cost analysis used previously, if Corporation B can obtain appropriate coverage at a cost of
less than sixty dollars per thousand dollars in value, it would be more
profitable for it to purchase that coverage. In other words, it would not
be reasonable for Corporation B to set up a reserve for self-insurance
"returning" (by means of premium cost saved) less than six percent if
that percentage represents the present value of the necessary reserve

amounts to the shareholders.66 To the extent that the corporation can
predict that its losses will be lower than the actuarial norm it will save

money by becoming a self-insurer, but any savings would result whether
or not the corporation recognizes the need to accumulate earnings and
"See. e.g., Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 197, 203 (4th Cir. 1957):
"There can be no doubt that reserves for such contingencies are proper. While saving the premiums
it would otherwise have had to pay, the petitioner assumed a direct liability in an undetermined
amount, and the reserve was an estimate of this contingent liability." (Emphasis added.)
"Id. In this case the taxpayer had argued that the reserves set up on its books were actually
insufficient in amounts, but the court determined that they were binding in the absence of actuarial
evidence to support its contention because they represented "what petitioner [had] currently conceived to be its potential liability in these areas." Id.
In Halby Chem. Co. v. United States, 10 Ct. Cl. 584 (1967), the corporations involved
"manufactured one or more products containing ingredients of a volatile nature, subject to possible
fire or explosion or both." Id. at 602. While the corporations carried some fire insurance, manage.
ment reasoned; (a) that this was insufficient to cover the full cost of new and improved machinery
(because of inflation and other factors) that would be purchased if the machinery currently in use
was destroyed; (b) that available business interruption insurance could not sufficiently cover potential losses; and (c) that the corporations were self-insurers in respect to damage claims that could
result from a fire or explosion. The Court of Claims apparently accepted these as proper purposes
for the accumulation of earnings. No estimates of the amounts necessary to meet any or all of
these contingencies are provided in the opinion, and in fact the courts seldom concern themselves
with amounts in their discussions of accumulations for self-insurance purposes.
"This assumes, contrary to reality, that the reserved funds are serving the single purpose of
providing protection from casualty losses. As we have seen, such funds usually will not be held
purely as cash but may be invested in relatively low-return but relatively risk-free liquid or "quick"
assets. In reality the liquid reserve is available for a myriad of needs, few of which are likely to
occur simultaneously.
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liquidity in order to meet anticipated losses. (A loss experience more

favorable than the norm might indicate that the reserve should reasonably be lower than that of the corporation with normal experience. 7 )

Thus the reasonableness of becoming a self-insurer is in direct proportion to the degree to which the corporation's loss experience is below

the norm. Reasonableness will increase substantially as the risk of loss
becomes actuarially greater; and as the risk approaches the uninsurable
category, by reason of cost or otherwise, the role of self-insurer becomes

not only reasonable but necessary. 8
What is most remarkable is the failure of courts to apply the "spe-

cific, definite, and feasible" requirements of the tax regulations to these
contingencies. While these requirements have been potent barriers in

other areas, particularly in respect to business expansion, definiteness
with respect to amounts needed is annoyingly lacking in the self-

insurance cases.

9

Computations, when made, seem haphazard. In

Magic Mart, Inc., 7° the taxpayer had experienced flood losses (primarily

damage to its inventory) valued at 16,596 dollars in 1957 and 6,966
dollars in 1963, including its average gross markup on sales of twentynine to thirty-five percent. Without explaining the method used to arrive

at the result, which was that suggested by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, the Tax Court determined that eleven thousand dollars was a
6T

he computation of the appropriate self-insurance reserve for accumulated earnings tax
purposes might be similar to that used in computing a bad debt reserve, Le. by computing the ratio
of the average losses over the past six years to the replacement value of assets that are exposed to
the risk of this kind of loss and applying that ratio to the total replacement value of these assets
at the end of the year. Cf. Black Motor Co., 41 B.T.A. 300 (1940). A (non-deductible) adjustment
could be made each year, adding the losses for the year and subtracting the amount of the reserve
at the beginning of the year. Such a formula is probably no worse than the Bardahl formula.
"For example, if Corporation B's investment is solely in plant and machinery worth $100,000
on which it earns $5,000 annually, it must be a self-insurer if the cost of insurance is $50 per $1,000
value or more. See, e.g., Magic Mart, Inc., 51 T.C. 775, 783-84 (1969) (prohibitive premiums),
acquiescedin result only, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. xxiv; Millane Nurseries & Tree Experts, Inc., II PH Tax Ct. Mem. 1683 (1942) (coverage impossible to obtain). See also California Motor Transport
Co., 12 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 605 (1943). Of these three cases, only Magic Mart mentions any
amounts as proper reserves.
"'In Coastal Casting Service, Inc. v. Phinney, 26 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-5862, 70-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 84,831 (S.D. Tex. 1970) the court found the taxpayer's need to be self-insured against products
liability claims "too speculative to fall within the classification of a concrete, specific need requiring
an accumulation." Id. at 70-5863, 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,833. In Oyster Shell Prods. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 313 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1963), the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's rejection
of he taxpayer's claimed flood damage risk as "so remote as to be a negligible risk" and "conjured
up." Id. at 453.
7051 T.C. 775 (1969), acquiesced in result only, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. xxiv.
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reasonable amount of earnings and profits to retain for this contingency
in the years 1958-62.1 Perhaps the method used by the taxpayer in

Bradford-Robinson PrintingCo. v. UnitedStates 2 is more sound, if less
liberal: in providing for a "key man" insurance fund, the corporation
made annual transfers to the fund "of the amounts which would be
decided by insurance companies for the insured's [sic] decided upon,""
and the district court found this proper. Since the temptation to fabricate or at least to overestimate needs in this area would seem as great
as in the area of business expansion, some sort of cost-benefit analysis
similar to that described here would be useful.
Uninsurable Contingencies:Irresistible Temptation?

William C. Atwater & Co. 74 is an authority frequently cited for the
proposition that contingencies in general are reasonable needs of business. 75 Atwater, however, involved the contingency of paying a judgment
that was on appeal, and the corporation had had to deposit a 375,000
dollar bond in order to free its attached bank accounts. 76 Thus the
liability was both specific and definite in amount. Nevertheless, the case
has been used by the Tax Court to support the reasonableness of a need
when the liability has been contingent only as to amount," and perhaps
only in Perfection Foods, Inc., 8 has it recognized a contingency as a

"IJd. at 784. The court is equally vague on how it arrived at the amount ($200,000) it considered
necessary for business expansion. Id. at 784-87. It used the Bardahlformula to arrive at working
capital needs. Id. at 782-83.
1l Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1278 (D. Colo. 1957).
7
Id. at 1280.
7410 T.C. 218 (1948), acquiesced in,1948-1 CuM. BULL. 1.
7
Cited in the following accumulated earnings tax cases: Bardahl Mfg. Corp., 34 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 1123 (1965); Bremerton Sun Publishing Co., 44 T.C. 566 (1965); John P. Scripps Newspapers, 44 T.C. 453 (1965); Perfection Foods, Inc., 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 68 (1965); Henry Van
Hummell, Inc., 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1942 (1964); J. Gordon Turnbull, 41 T.C. 358 (1963);
Jerome E. Casey, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 865 (1957), rev'd, 267 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1959); and in Rev.
Rul. 70-301, 1970-1 CuM. BULL. 139.
7110 T.C. at 240. The taxpayer had also been advised that it could not legally pay dividends
under the laws of its state of incorporation. Id. at 251.
7Bremerton Sun Publishing Co., 44 T.C. 566, 585-86 (1965); John P. Scripps Newspapers,
44 T.C. 453, 471 (1965). These cases concerned obligations under unqualified profit-sharing and
retirement plans. Congress has provided standards of reasonableness in respect to the funding of
such plans in the provisions relating to the deductibility of contributions to qualified plans contained in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 404.
734 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 68 (1965).
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reasonable need of the business but found that "[p]etitioner has failed
to establish the reasonableness of the amount of surplus accumulated"
because the evidence introduced" was in vague and general terms which
' '7a
we find to be unconvincing.
In Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner,80 the Fourth
Circuit defined a contingency as "a reasonable need for which a business
may provide, if the likelihood, not merely the remote possibility, of its
occurrence reasonably appears to a prudent business firm."', The definition is fair enough, but if the tax regulation requirements of specific,
definite, and feasible are generally applicable they should be applied
here as well. Some computation of the amounts needed would be appropriate.
In Ted Bates & Company, Inc., 2 the Tax Court dealt with a tax-

payer facing, in perhaps its most acute form, the type of conventionally
uninsurable risk attributed to Corporation C in the hypotheticals previously given-the problem of continuing in business if a major client
or customer goes elsewhere. The corporation, an advertising agency,
had twelve to nineteen clients in the period 1957-61, and of these, the
five largest accounted for 73.1 percent to 77.3 percent of its revenue and
the two largest accounted for 41.6 percent to 44.0 percent. 3 It had a
fixed annual rental obligation of 829,000 dollars, paid its employees
(other than officers) from 3,709,078.26 dollars in 1957 to 7,260,648.60
dollars in 1962 in salaries, and contributed from 603,450.57 dollars to
1,718,012.60 dollars to employee benefit plans. The Tax Court found
that the corporation's need to continue to pay rent and salaries (and
apparently, to make profit-sharing plan contributions as well) in the
event of the loss of a major client was a reasonably anticipated need,
and it computed the amount of the reserve needed for this contingency
to be 2,000,000 dollars in 1957 and 1958, and 2,300,000 dollars in 1959,
1960, and 1961.85
"Id. at 73. The contingency was the carrying of peak period accounts receivable. About six
months later, in Bardahl Mfg. Co., 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1123 (1965), the Tax Court considered
this need as a part of the working capital need and established its own formula for computing the
amount reasonably needed.
80241 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1957).
Id. at 206.
134 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1476 (1965). See also L.R. Teeple Co., 47 B.T.A. 270, 278-79 (1942),
acquiesced in, 1942-2 CuM. BULL. 18.
"34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 1483.
"Id. at 1481-82.
81ld. at 1492.
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The method used in making this computation is mysterious.
Rounding off the figures for 1957, the total of these obligations for that
year as determined by the Tax Court is something in excess of 5,000,000
dollars. Forty percent of that, approximately the percentage represented
by the two largest clients, is 2,000,000 dollars. But by 1959 the total of
these obligations is over 6,000,000 dollars, and forty percent of that is
2,400,000 dollars, not 2,300,000 dollars. By 1962 the total is more than
8,000,000 dollars, and forty percent of that is 3,200,000 dollars."
In addition, the Tax Court made two errors in reviewing the needs
of the corporation-errors which are both logically inconsistent with the
stated purpose of the contingent reserve just described and contradictory
to each other. First, the court stated that a reserve for deductible expenses is "invalid as a matter of law""7 and refused to allow the corporation
any reserve for expenses in promoting new business. Yet in the event of
the loss of one or more major clients this type of expense would be as
reasonable and necessary as the continuance of salary and rental payments. Salary and rental payments are, of course, also deductible expenses, and they were included in computing the contingency reserve.
Second, as a part of the corporation's expenses that would continue
even though major clients were lost, the court included contributions to
a profit-sharing plan.8" The plan is not described in the opinion, but it
would seem that, like future income taxes, 9 no reserve is needed since
by definition such contributions are normally made out of current earnings.
The Ted Bates decision has been examined in some detail since it
demonstrates some of the weaknesses and failures of analysis in this
area. Few business managers would argue that the needs of this advertising agency for reserve funds were not both legitimate and reasonable,
"Ifthe Tax Court had found that the reasonable needs of the business exceeded the accumu-

lated earnings of the corporation, the amount needed for this purpose would be unimportant, at
least to the extent of the excess over the accumulations. But since the Tax Court found that there
were excess accumulations in three of the five years involved (1958, 1959 and 1961), the precise

amount needed becomes crucial, both to the taxpayer and to the government, in computing the
credit that the taxpayer is entitled to under
Mem. at 1493-94.

INT.

REV. CODE

OF

1954, § 535(c)(1). 34 P-H Tax Ct.

"Id. at 1492, citing Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 495, 502 (4th
Cir. 1960) in respect to depreciation and depletion expenses. Perhaps the weakness is one of
advocacy, as apparently the taxpayer treated these expenses separately from its needs in the event
of a loss of clients.
Id. at 1482, 1491.
"See Bardahl Mfg. Co., 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1123, 1142 (1965).
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yet reasonable men could differ substantially about the specific amounts

necessary. But if reasonableness of the need is conceded, how are the
uncertainties inherent in this kind of need reconciled with the expressed

Congressional intent that the taxpayer have "specific and definite plans
for

. . .

use [of the accumulated funds] in the business" and that those

plans be neither "vague and indefinite" nor "postponed indefinitely"?"
The Tax Court's solution has been mostly to ignore this expression of
intent as inapplicable and thereby to create what might be thought to

be a substantial loophole in the coverage of the accumulated earnings

tax. " The Congressional intent may be irreconcilable, but it is hard to

conceive any argument that would make it inapplicable.
Technologically Postponed Replacement

The need of Corporation D, with its air-polluting diesel-powered
buses, is, in our environmentally conscious era, undoubtedly a reasona-

bly anticipated need." The threat of legal action, both from civil nuisH.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1954). In Inland Oil & Chem. Corp. v. United
States, 338 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Md. 1972), the corporation's plans were, alternatively, to use
accumulated funds to finance accounts receivable which would result if a program of business
diversification and expansion were undertaken or to purchase a new plant location in order to
relieve dangerous crowding in its existing plant. The first alternative was chosen, but the "directors
did not have in mind at that time a specific amount by which accounts receivable would increase
. . . but they knew it would be substantial." Id. at 1333. Quoting Electric Regulator Co. v.
Commissioner, 336 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1964), the court found these needs reasonable, even in the
absence of specific figures. 338 F. Supp. at 1335. But the court rejected an estimated $100,000 need
for trailers and other equipment in the expanded business when "no evidence was offered with
respect to rates of depreciation, rentals or purchase arrangements, contemplated or actual," id. at
1333, and rejected any need to be a self-insurer though evidence was offered in respect to the latter.
Id. at 1335 n.10. The court's liberality in respect to the needs to finance receivables might be
explained by the fact that the corporation's investment in cash and Treasury Bills dropped from
$360,000 to $10,000 in the five years subsequent to the year at issue.
"On the other hand, the Treasury has been consistent in its opposition to reserves for contingencies that are incapable of precise measurement. The tax regulations approve contingent grounds
for accumulation only by way of a negative exception. ("Retention of earnings and profits to
provide against unrealistic hazards" as an indication of accumulations is beyond the reasonable
needs of the business. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2(c)(5) (1969).) It is apparent in the cases dealing with
contingencies cited previously that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has frequently argued
vagueness and indefiniteness in attacking reserves in this area. In Rev. Rul. 70-301, 1970-1 CuM.
BULL. 138, the Atwater case is cited as support for accumulating to meet a contingent liability,
but one that is specific and definite in amount (a proposed assessment of the accumulated earnings
tax for the prior year). But cf Rev. Rul. 72-306, 1972 INT. REv. BULL. No. 25, at 8.
"The relevance of pollution-control needs of manufacturing businesses is perhaps best illustrated in the attitude of the Securities and Exchange Commission. On July 19, 1971, the Commission announced its interpretation that the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws
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ance suits seeking injunctive relief and from its franchising authority,
makes the need to replace its buses most specific, and it is clear that it
can definitely compute the costs of the currently available gasolinepowered replacement vehicles by obtaining price quotes or bids. But
should Corporation D purchase the gasoline-powered buses, or should
it postpone its commitment to a new bus fleet, perhaps indefinitely, and
see if the steam-powered, pollution-free vehicles will become available?
Since it is assumed in this hypothetical that operating costs will not be
affected by the decision to replace now or to postpone replacement, it
is more reasonable, from management's point of view, to postpone
dealing with its pollution problem until a complete solution is available.
The risk of too early replacement in these circumstances is great. If the
corporation were to replace the fleet immediately and the steampowered pollution-free buses became available, it might be necessary to
finance a second replacement with its reserves already expended. Sound
and reasonable financial planning would dictate holding the reserve at
least until the commercial viability of steam-powered buses is proved or
disproved. 3
Yet if the corporation presents these facts as a defense against
assessment of the accumulated earnings tax, the response undoubtedly
would be that its plans are perhaps specific, perhaps even definite, but
certainly at this point in time not feasible. Authority for this position is
KOMA, Inc. v. Commissioner,4 in which the taxpayer had estimates
of the costs of facilities for broadcasting FM and television as early as
1940. In affirming the Tax Court's rejection of this as grounds for the
accumulation of earnings the Tenth Circuit observed: "At the time...
television was in an experimental stage; no equipment was on the market; no coaxial cable was availble prior to 1950; no one knew or could
tell with a reasonable degree of certainty the cost of such a station, if
and when it could be constructed, or whether it would be commercially
feasible." 5
"call for disclosure, if material, when compliance with statutory requirements with respect to
environmental quality, e.g., various air, water and other anti-pollution laws, may necessitate significant capital outlays, may materially affect the earnings power of the business, or cause material
changes in registrant's business done or intended to be done." SEC Securities Act Release No.
9252 (July 19, 1971).
"3See Goldstein & Ford, The Management of Air Quality: Legal Structures and Official
Behavior, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 40 (1971).
9189 F.2d 390 (10th Cir. 1951).
' 5Id. at 396. The holding is complicated by the fact that "while the corporations contend that
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If this is the reasoning to be followed (the case was decided prior
to the elimination of the immediacy test but the result is entirely consistent with the tax regulations adopted under section 537),9 it is in direct
contradiction to what would be reasonable absent the accumulated earnings tax.
Delayed Replacement and Depreciation

The contradiction becomes even more apparent when the attitude
of the taxing authorities towards reserves for replacement of operating
assets is examined. It has already been demonstrated in previous illustrations that under appropriate circumstances reasonable financial planning will dictate the postponement of investment when the present value
of the anticipated return from the postponed investment is greater than
the present value of the return from an alternative investment made
immediately. This is directly applicable to Corporation E's decision to
maintain its old widget-making machines in service rather than replacing them as they become fully depreciated. If, for example, Corporation
E is enjoying a nine percent return on its investment in the old machines
(and could expect a similar return if it invested its accumulated replacement reserves in new machines of the same type), it can afford to wait
up to five years to invest the funds if the return from the same funds
then invested in the new machines will return thirteen percent. The
advantage of waiting will be diminished by the cost of increased repair
and maintenance of the old machines, but the cost of waiting, as has
been demonstrated, is capable of reasonable calculation and estimation.
The reasonableness of that cost will depend on management's prediction
of the advantage to be gained from the new machines and its confidence
in the accuracy of its own prediction. Management will be aware, however, that it is often willingness to accept the risks imposed by such
uncertainties that makes one business more successful than its competitors.
Further, if the corporation is in the happy position of having funds
available in excess of what is being accumulated to replace its old machines, it is entirely reasonable to use these funds to invest in additional
it was necessary to set aside these reserves for their reasonable needs in the reasonable foreseeable
future, they were loaning their earnings to [the major shareholder] and his other enterprises instead
of declaring dividends." Id. But cf.Havens & Martin v. United States, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 95,503
(E.D. Va. 1965).
"See text accompanying note 5 supra.
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machines of the old type rather than using them to pay dividends,
provided the present value of the anticipated return from the increased
capacity exceeds the present value of a dividend to the shareholders.' 7
So long as the latter is not influenced by the shareholders' own tax
considerations, the investment is entirely reasonable and does not contradict the plan to ultimately replace the old machines.
Taxing authorities' considerations of reserves for replacement are,
however, devastating to this type of reasoning. First of all, since depreciation is "a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear
(including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) . . . of property

used in the trade or business,""8 it might be thought that the accumulated depreciation (in respect to unretired and unreplaced depreciable
property) of the corporation is some measure of the amount reasonably
necessary to replace such property. But in Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp.
v. Commissioner" the court flatly rejected the idea, since "[s]urplus has
already been reduced by annual charges to depreciation expense [and]
allowing them again would give the taxpayer double deductions."'90 The
court was "cognizant of the fact that replacement of taxpayer's wasting
assets will ultimately become necessary," and that for this purpose cash
or other liquid assets must be available.' 1 But it concluded: "Replacement of assets which are fully depreciated

. . .

requires available cash

but does not require a second appropriation of surplus. It is only when
rehabilitation plans involve replacement of old equipment with equipment costing more than the original, or when additional equipment is
required, that appropriation of surplus is justified."'' 0
This analysis is confusing since the same opinion states that it is
"liquid assets in excess of the immediate or reasonably foreseeable business needs of the corporation" that will indicate that imposition of the
accumulated earnings tax is appropriate. 103 Since the depreciation allowance may cause liquidity to increase faster than surplus is accumulated, '° this puts the corporation in an awkward position.
"See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a).
"1274 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1960).
10
d. at 502./
101Id.

1111d. at 503.
11id. at 501.
"'°Asevery fan of real estate tax shelters knows, the depreciation deduction is a non-cash item.
Assume, for example a corporation with assets at the opening of its taxable year with assets
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Relying on Smoot Sand & Gravel, the Fifth Circuit in Battelstein
Investment Co. v. United States'0 5 rather summarily rejected a taxconsisting solely of depreciable property with a book value (after prior year's depreciation) of
$200,000. It has no liabilities except for shareholder's equity consisting of paid-in capital of $10,000
and accumulated surplus of $190,000. Following the Smoot Sand & Gravel analysis, it is safe at
this point from the accumulated earnings tax since all its surplus "has been translated into...
assets related to its business." Id. at 501.
If during the year this corporation has a cash income of $20,000 before its depreciation
deduction and that deduction equals $20,000 so that there is no taxable income, its balance sheet
will look like this:
Assets
Liabilities
Liquid (Cash)
$20,000
Shareholder's Equity
Fixed (Depreciable Assets after
Paid-In Capital
$10,000
Depreciation
$180,000
Accumulated Surplus
$190,000
$200,000
$200,000
Thus, while there has been no addition to surplus, the corporation now has $20,000 with which
either to meet reasonably anticipated needs or to pay dividends.
Similarly, if the corporation has the same cash income before depreciation but a depreciation
deduction of $30,000, and thus an operating loss of $10,000, its closing balance sheet will look like
this:
Assets
Liabilities
Liquid (Cash)
$20,000
Shareholder's Equity
Fixed (Depreciable Assets after
Paid-In Capital
$10,000
Depreciation)
$170,000
Accumulated Surplus
$180,000
$190,000
$190,000
Thus, even in a loss year the corporation is increasing its liquidity, and its ability to pay
dividends if the funds generated by the depreciation deduction are not needed for replacement or
other purposes.
Of course, in neither of these two situations will the corporation be subject to the accumulated
earnings tax for the year under discussion since the tax is assessed only against accumulated taxable
income for the year (INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 531, 535, 563) and there is no taxable income.
But what if the cash income is $20,000 and the depreciation deduction is only $10,000? The closing
balance sheet will look like this:
Assets
Liabilities
Liquid (Cash)
$20,000
Shareholder's Equity
Fixed (Depreciable Assets after
Paid-In Capital
$10,000
Depreciation)
$190,000
Accumulated Surplus
$200,000
$210,000
$210,000
The corporation will have to justify retention of $20,000 in liquid assets if it pays no dividend.
If it invests $10,000 of its cash in additional fixed assets before the close of the year, should it still
be subject to the assessment of the accumulated earnings tax?
111442 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1971).
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payer's argument which at least by implication equated the depreciation
reserve with its replacement needs. While admitting that "[o]ne difficulty we have is that of understanding," ' 6 the court found that there was
no error of law in the trial court's finding that the taxpayer had failed
to prove that replacement needs justified its accumulations., 7 The court
also relied on Revenue Ruling 67-64,108 which held that
although the reserve for depreciation itself may be considered and
given appropriate weight as a part of the facts and circumstances in
considering the reasonable needs of the business, the concept that a
noncash deduction for depreciation based on historic costs requires the
setting aside for an indefinite period a cash fund adjusted for economic
fluctuations in order to provide for total replacement of plant assets
the meaning of the term "reasonable needs of the busiis not within
09
ness."'1
The Treasury cited no authority for its ruling other than the regulations
and the legislative history of section 537,110 and the implication of Smoot
Sand & Gravel is to the contrary.'
In contrast, the accounting profession, which has been faced with
the problem of properly accounting for replacement needs, especially
since the inflationary period immediately after World War II, recognized in 1947 that
business management has the responsibility of providing for replacement of plant and machinery. . .There is no doubt that in considering
depreciation in connection with product costs, prices, and business
policies, management must take into consideration the probability that
plant and machinery will have to be replaced at costs much greater
0

'Id. at 89.
"'Id.at 88, 89.
'11967-1 CuM. BULL. 150.
"lId. at 151.
"'See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
"'In addition, see Walter C. McMinn, Jr., 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1003, 1021 (1962): "We

recognize that a reasonable reserve for replacement of depreciable plant and equipment, possibly
even in excess of a cost depreciation reserve where prices have increased, may be a reasonable

business need. But there is no evidence here to indicate that these two plants would have to be
replaced anytime soon (they were still in use at the time of the trial) or that the available funds
would not take care of this need."

In contrast, a replacement reserve was held to be reasonable in Oklahoma Press Publishing
Co. v. United States, 437 F.2d 1275, 1279 (10th Cir. 1971) while a quite similar reserve was held

to be not within the requirements of the tax regulations. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
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than those of facilities now in use. 12
The committee on accounting procedure of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants expressed its belief that the problem
should not be met by increasing depreciation charges against current
income since "it would not increase the usefulness of reported corporate
income figures if some companies charged depreciation on appraised
values while others adhered to cost. 113 In reaffirming its opinion in
1948 the committee noted that
[w]hen prices have risen appreciably since original investments in plant
and facilities were made, a substantial portion of net income as currently reported must be reinvested in the business in order to maintain
assets at the same level of productivity at the end of the year as at the
beginning.
Stockholders, employees, and the general public should be informed that a business must be able to retain out ofprofits amounts
sufficient to replaceproductivefacilities at currentprices if it is to stay

in business."4
The accounting profession's view is aimed primarily at the accurate
reporting of financial positions on a comparable basis, and everyone is
aware that accounting procedures for tax purposes will often differ from
that for book or reporting purposes. Nevertheless, substantial weight
should be given to what the accounting profession considers to be in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles when the
question is one of reasonableness. But the difficulty in finding tax authority that specifically approves an accumulation out of earnings for
the replacement of depreciating assets is surpassed only by the difficulty
of imagining of an operating and continuing business that does not have
this need.
CONCLUSION

It is not within the intention of this article to reach any final conclu'"COMM. ON ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE, AM. INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS,
RESEARCH BULL. No.

ACCOUNTING

33 at 267 (1947).

"lid. at 268.
"'Letter from Samuel J. Broad to American Institute of Accountants, Oct. 14, 1948, in COMM.
ON ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE, AM. INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULL.

No. 34, at 270(B) (1948) (emphasis added).
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sions in respect to the validity of Treasury and court rulings on the
specific types of anticipated needs of the business that have been described, nor is it within that intention to propose any specific measurements of reasonably anticipated needs. This article has achieved its
intended purpose if it has demonstrated that the standards of taxing
authorities do not reflect the realities of corporate financial thinking in
respect to business needs and reserves, and that these standards are
often inconsistent within themselves when they are applied to different
types of anticipated needs.
The consequence is that the closely held corporation within the
scope of the accumulated earnings tax"' will find itself subject to limitations on the retention of earnings that are not applicable to publicly held
corporations.' In recognizing this, the Second Circuit has commented:
Courts, however, must not blind themselves to the realities in this age
of rapid technological change. The product of today is frequently outmoded tomorrow. . . . Nor is it always possible for a company in
advance to set aside a specific sum to achieve a specific goal. Comments made in the past to the effect that a definite plan actually
followed through must be on the company's books and records before
moneys assigned thereto become anticipated needs may have to be
appropriately qualified in particular cases.
If the Tax Court's views. . . were to be accepted, they would give
to the Treasury virtually absolute power to stifle or encourage economic growth as it-not the corporate directors-decided how each
company should handle its corporate and financial affairs."'
It may be an appropriate national policy to encourage the ownership of businesses among large groups of shareholders by special liberality towards the publicly held corporation in the accumulation of liquidity, but this is clearly not the purpose of the accumulated earnings tax.
If this were its purpose, the structure of the tax would make it a remarkably ill-designed tool. Yet this is a substantial side effect of the tax and
its enforcement in the courts, and it is probable that this side effect
outweighs any effectiveness the tax may have in achieving its stated
"'See note 6 supra.
'Perhaps the only legal limitation on the retention of earnings by publicly held corporations

is the risk of actions to compel dividends. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-50(j)-() (1965); 1I. HE3NN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 667-69 (1970).

"TElectric Regulator Co. v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 339, 345-46 (2d Cir. 1964); see Simons,
The GatheringStorm of Section 531 of Our Tax Laws, 44 TAxEs 528, 529 (1966); Ziegler, supra
note 25, at 120-21.
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purpose as a means of policing tax avoidance.
Two solutions suggest themselves. First, section 537 might be redrafted to encourage consideration of the real practices of businesses,
whether publicly held or closely held, with respect to the retention of
earnings."' It might be preferable to restructure the tax entirely so as
to base its application on the reasonableness of the corporation's dividend policy in comparison with that of similarly situated public corpora-

tions."'
Second, the Treasury and the courts, with an eye to the teachings
of financial planning experts, might devise objective computations and
formulas which may be used as standards of reasonableness in respect
to specific types of needs. The Bardahl formula in respect to working
capital needs is precedent for this. However much the blind application
of this formula by the Internal Revenue Service to every potential accumulated earnings may be criticized, its existence affords reliable protection to the corporation which possesses liquid assets that are within the
limits of that formula.
Perhaps the most inviting solution is the repeal of the accumulated
earnings tax altogether as having outlived its usefulness. Since it is
entirely permissible under the statutes and regulations for a corporation
"'The Bible-Evins bill, S. 1615, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972), H.R. 7692, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1972), is pending in Congress. Section 405 of this bill would reduce the accumulated earnings tax
rate to a flat 22% and increase the minimum credit provided in §§ 535(c)(2)-(3) from $100,000 to
$150,000. In addition, it would authorize the Secretary of the Treasury
to prescribe by regulations a minimum credit (in lieu of the $150,000 amount . . .) of
not more than $250,000 for any corporation which
(A) is a small business concern (within the meaning of the Small Business Act), and
(B) established a reasonable intention of future expansion which would require
193
retaining earnings and profits for the taxable year in excess of $150,000.
It would also extend the possibility of shifting the burden of proof to the government in cases tried
in the district court and the Court of Claims as well as in the Tax Court. Most importantly, the
bill would add a new § 538, which would permit the payment of designated dividends in reduction
of accumulated taxable income for years in which an accumulated tax liability has been determined, within 90 days after the determination. This latter provision would seem to eliminate
imposition of the tax almost entirely (though not necessarily the tax risk of accumulating). But in
respect to the $250,000 credit, is a "reasonable intention . . . which would require retaining
earnings and profits" significantly different from a "reasonably anticipated need"?
"'See Ziegler, supra note 25, at 122. Similarly, in Harry A. Koch Co. v. Vinal, 228 F. Supp.
782 (D. Neb. 1964), the court compared the taxpayer's ratio of current assets to current liabilities
to that of another firm in the same business: "Comparison with the ratio of a respectable firm
engaged in the same type of business is a quite effective method of determining what is a reasonable
ratio for the kind of business with which we are dealing." Id. at 785.
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to avoid "the income tax with respect to its shareholders"' by using
unneeded earnings and profits to "acquire a business enterprise through
purchasing stock or assets"' 2' or by investing in "any line of business
which it may [choose to] undertake,"' 22 the tax is really only a trap for
the unwary or unimaginative. In reality, with the exception of investments in marketable securities that are unrelated to the business, it is
probable that corporate management will retain high liquidity in investments with little or no return only if it is believed necessary for the
actual needs of the business. Thus conservative financial management
is penalized and aggressive investment on thin reserves is rewarded.,

"OINT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 532(a).
12Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2(b)(2) (1959).
122Treas. Reg. § 1.537-3(a) (1959).
rnFor evidence that this has been the effect of the tax for some time see D. SMITH, EFFECTs
OF TAXATION: CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY

194-99 (1952).

